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Abstract 
This paper constructs an intra-industry trade model with vertical product differentiation and considers a free-
trade region where two countries of different income levels to investigate the welfare effects of falling trade 
costs. It shows that the trade patterns are affected by the income disparity of integrated countries. Moreover, 
this study finds that the impacts of falling trade costs on the welfare of the two countries are asymmetric 
depending on the relative income disparity. At some levels of income disparity and some stages of economic 
integration, there may indeed conflict interests between rich and poor countries with respect to continuing the 
process of market integration. It implies that a fall in trade costs does not always benefit all countries. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the early 1990s, regional integrations prevail as the GATT Uruguay Round of negotiation reached an 
impasse. After the suspension of the WTO Doha Round negotiations and the frustration of multilateral trade 
liberalization, many countries proceed to focus on the regional trade agreements (Regional Trade Agreement, 
RTA) negotiations. Therefore, the welfare effects of economic integration (a reduction in trade costs) have 
become an important issue in the trade literature. The reciprocal dumping model (Brander, 1981; Brander and 
Krugman, 1983) shows that Cournot competition in segmented markets can generate intra-industry trade 
(IIT), even though countries are identical and the goods are perfect welfare. Another attractive outcome of 
these models is that trade can reduce welfare. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the welfare effects of 
economic integration by introducing vertical differentiated products and price competition. 
To the best of our knowledge Clark and Collie (2003) is the pioneer to examine the welfare effects of 
trade in an international oligopoly with horizontal differentiated products under price competition. They use a 
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quadratic utility function to analyze welfare in a symmetric two-country model with one producer in each 
country. A striking conclusion from their model is that there are always gains from trade. Moreover, the 
welfare increases as the trade costs decrease under unilateral trade due to the considerable effect of potential 
competition and a U-shaped welfare curve under multilateral trade due to resource waste in costly trade 
activities. Friberg and Ganslandt (2008) analyze if the result in Clark and Collie (2003) extends to an 
international oligopoly in which firms produce horizontal differentiated products and price competition. They 
show that trade can reduce welfare compared to autarky in a Bertrand model when the local markets are 
sufficiently competitive and products are sufficiently close substitutes. A gain there is a U-shaped welfare 
curve under multilateral trade, in the presence of welfare increasing only if two products are almost 
independent. 
Although there are great achievements from these literatures, they only focus on intra-industry trade with 
homogeneous or horizontal differentiated goods. In the empirical studies, Fontagné et al. (2006) decomposed 
the total share of IIT into horizontal and vertical components, showing that the majority of IIT is, in fact, 
vertical IIT. These studies point to the necessity of taking into account not only the horizontal but also the 
vertical aspects of IIT. In the theoretical studies, Niem and Kim (2010) find that the Vertical IIT volume is 
higher among countries where R&D investments are larger. Kim and Niem (2011) extend their early model to 
focus on the impact of preference diversity and relative country size on IIT index with a vertically 
differentiated product. Even though their results are interesting, but they do not consider the welfare effect of 
free trade under vertical IIT. In this paper, we aim to contribute to the understanding of the welfare effect of 
falling trade costs when products are vertical differentiated. 
The other important issue in the trade literature is the welfare impacts of economic integration for 
differences among the member countries in terms of market size, income levels or technology levels etc. In 
empirical studies, Vicard (2011) finds that the effectiveness of an RTA in enhancing trade between two 
countries varies depending on both the economic characteristics of the country pair and the characteristics of 
all other members of the RTA. In particular, the size and distribution of GDP between members are crucial. In 
the theoretical studies, Markusen (1981) shows the small market will always gain from trade, but the country 
with the large market may lose from trade if the output of its firm falls as a result of a free trade. Haufler and 
Wooton (2010) set up a model of generalized oligopoly to explore on the development of tax rates for 
attracting internationally mobile firms by national governments and its welfare results in small and large 
countries as economic integration proceeds. They find that a range of trade costs is identified where economic 
integration raises the welfare of small country, but lowers welfare in the large country. The purpose of this 
paper is to focus on whether the member countries may be conflicting interests with respect to continuing the 
process of market integration in the presence of income disparity, rather than to challenge the debates of gains 
from trade under price competition. For the purpose, we set up a model that incorporates vertically 
differentiated products and a free-trade region where two countries with different income levels. In this 
setting, our model delivers several interesting results. First of all, the trade patterns are affected by the 
differentials in income level of integrated countries. A low quality firm will unilaterally export when the 
income disparity is large. Secondly, at some levels of income disparity and some stages of economic 
integration, there may indeed be conflicting interests between rich and poor countries. It also implies a fall in 
trade costs does not always benefit all countries from the process of economic integration.    
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Sections 3 and 4 describe the welfare 
analysis when the income disparity is small and large, respectively. Finally, section 5 provides concluding 
remarks. 
 
2. The model 
We consider a free-trade region with two countries H and L. The two countries potentially differ in their 
income level. In each country, the income distribution of the residents is uniformly distributed over the 
interval [0, 
jT ], j = H, L. We assume that L HsT T  and 0 < s d 1. So that, country L is as rich as country H if 
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s = 1; while country L is poorer than country H when s < 1. Each country has a single firm that produces a 
vertically differentiated product. Assume that the firm located in the rich country H offers a high quality good, 
denoted as firm h; the firm located in the poor country L offers a low quality good, denoted as firm l. The two 
firms play price competition in the market when intra-industry trade takes place. To simplify the model, we 
assume that marginal production costs of the two firms are zero, but there is a trade cost of W per unit when 
products are traded between two countries.  
Consumers in both countries have identical preferences for the goods. Each consumer buys at most one 
unit of the product when the net surplus he gets from consumption is non-negative. The utility from 
consuming product i for a consumer k with income index [0, ]j jkT T  in country j  can be presented as 
follows: 
( ) ,   , ,  , ,j j ji i ik kU q p i h l j H LT T                                           (1) 
where qi is the quality of product i and pij is the price of good i in country j. For simplicity, we assume that ql = 
Oqh and 0 < O < 1. The parameter O measures the quality difference between the two products. It implies that 
the vertical differentiation of the two products is larger when O is lower. Due to the qualities are 
predetermined before the market competition. We refer the qualities to be exogenous in the following 
analysis. 
 
2.1 The Autarky Equilibrium 
Under autarky, each firm behaves as a monopolist in its own country. The marginal consumer in country j 
who is indifferent between buying good i and refraining from buying, is ˆ j AT = (piA/qi), the superscript “A” 
noted as the autarky case. All consumers with T  > ˆ j AT  will purchase the monopoly product. So, we can have 
the market demand of product i as xiA = [
jT  ( piA/ qi)]/ jT . Substituting xiA into the profit function, 
A A A
i i ip xS  , and differentiating with respect to piA, we obtain the optimal sales and prices for each firm, which 
are xiA = 1/2 and piA = (qi / 2) 
jT . We also yield the profit for each firm under the autarky case as follows: 
SiA= (qi/4) jT , i =h, l, j =H, L.                                                           (2) 
 The consumer surplus and social welfare for country j under autarky are shown to be: 
( /8) , 
jj A
iCS q T (3 /8) , , ,  , . jjA iSW q i h l j H LT                              (3) 
 
2.2 Open Economies  
Define 1ˆ
jT  as the marginal consumer who is indifferent from consuming either of the two products in country 
j, and obtain 1ˆ
jT = (phjplj)/[qh(1O)] from (1). Similarly, define 2ˆjT  as the marginal consumer who is 
indifferent from buying a low-quality good and no buy, and have 2ˆ
jT = (plj /Oqh). We now yield the market 
demands for firm i , i = h, l, in country j, j = H, L, as follows: 



















                                                     (4) 







hh xpxp WS    ,)( HlHlLlLll xpxp WS                                               (5) 
where W  is the per unit trade cost for exporting. Substituting (4) into (5) and differentiating with respect to 
price pij yields as follows: 
[2(1 ) ]/(4 ),
HH
h hp qO T W O      [ (1 ) 2 ] / (4 ),HHl hp qO O T W O     
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2[(1 ) ] / (4 ),
LL
h hp qO T W O      [(1 ) ] / (4 ).LLl hp qO O T W O                        (6) 
The sales of firm i in country j can be written as follows:  
[2(1 ) ]/(4- ) ,
H HH
h hx qO T W O MT     [ (1 ) (2 ) ]/ (4- ) ,H HHl hx qO O T O W O O MT      
[2(1 ) (2 ) ]/(4- ) ,
L LL
h hx qO T O W O MT      [(1 ) ]/(4- ) ,L LLl hx qO T W O MT                              (7) 
where I { (1O)qh > 0 due to 0 < O < 1.  
From (7), it indicates that firm h will export to country L (i.e., xhL > 0), only if W < Wh { 2I LT /(2OĪįġ
Similarly, firm l will export to country H (i.e., xlH > 0) only if W < Wl { OI HT /(2O). Comparing Wh and Wl , 
given the quality difference, O, we find that Wh > Wl if the income disparity is small, i.e., (O/2) < s d 1 . 
Otherwise, we have Wh d Wl if  0 < s d (O/2). 
 
Insert figure 1 and 2 about here. 
 
    The unilateral trade cases in figures 1 and 2 are worth noting. When income disparity is small, as shown in 
figure 1, even under symmetric case (s = 1), only firm h (high-quality firm) is able to export unilaterally under 
a higher trade cost. This is because the income disparity is small and thus consumers in country L can afford 
high-quality goods. However, when income disparity is large, as shown in figure 2, consumers in country L 
are too poor to purchase the imported high quality goods. Therefore, only firm l (low quality firm) has an 
opportunity to export unilaterally to rich country H. The above results are summarized in proposition 1.  
 
Proposition 1. There is a range of trade costs under which unilateral trade takes place. We find the 
following:   
(1) A high quality firm (low quality firm) unilaterally exports when the level of income disparity of two 
countries is small (large), say (O/2) < s d 1 (0 < s d (O/2)).  
(2) Only the high quality firm unilaterally exports under the symmetric case (s = 1). 
 
Since the trade patterns are affected by the income disparity. In what follows, we analyze the welfare 
effects of falling trade costs into two cases. Firstly, we discuss the small income disparity case in section 3 
and then the large income disparity case in section 4. 
 
3. Welfare analysis: a small income disparity ((O/2) < s d 1; that is Wh > Wl )    
3.1 No trade: W >Wh 
As mentioned above, when the trade costs are high (W > Wh), there is no trade occurs. The correspondence 
welfare of country H is expressed in (3), labelled as AB  in figure 3.  However, there is another story in 
country L. When the trade costs fall into (Wh , W0) , even though no trade actually occurs, firm l sets a price 
below its monopoly price to deter firm h.  The welfare increases with price reducing. Therefore, the welfare of 
country L consists of two segments. It is independent of  W  when W > W0    (labelled as ab  in figure 4) and 
decreasing in W  when Wh < W d W0   (labelled as bc  in figure 4). 
 
Insert figure 3 and 4 about here. 
3.2 Unilateral trade: Wl < W d Wh 
When the trade costs further reduce to (Wl, Wh), recall figure 1, only firm h can unilaterally export to country L. 
In this case, firm h is still a monopolist in country H; while two firms compete in a Bertrand type in country L. 
Hence, the consumer surplus in country H does not change and firm h earns additional profits from its exports 
to country L, leading to an increase in welfare of country H. The welfare level is decreasing in W when the 
803 Zhi-Win Wu and Yan-Shu Lin /  Procedia Economics and Finance  5 ( 2013 )  799 – 808 
trade costs are falling in (Wl, Wh), which is shown as BC  in figure 3. 
Meanwhile, a fall in trade costs reduces firm l’s profits due to intensive competition in country L, i.e., ( 
ld dS W ) > 0. Besides, the sales of firm l decrease and those of firm h increase in country L when trade costs 
falling, i.e., (dxlL/dW) > 0, (dxhL/dW) < 0. The consumer surplus from purchasing low quality goods thus 
decreases (dCSlL/dW) > 0) and that from purchasing high quality goods increases, (dCShL/dW) < 0. In sum, there 
are gains for consumers from unilateral trade due to varieties available. And, it is increasing with respect to 
the trade costs falling, (dCSL/dW) < 0. Adding up LCS  and  lS  to form LSW and differentiating that with 
respect toW, we yields: 
2 ˆ[ ] ( ) 0,     ( ) ,






W T W WW O O  t  t      where ˆ
LW { I LT > 0.                      (8) 
Comparing ˆLW with Wl, we find that ˆLW > (d) Wl if s > (d) sl { [O/(2O)]. We discuss in the following two cases. 
 
Case (L1): sl < s d 1 
Under case (L1), there is less income disparity of the highest rich residents between country L and that in 
country H. It implies that there are more residents in country L who can afford the high quality goods. The 
welfare gains from high quality good is stronger turning the welfare upward after trade cost lower than ˆLW , 
which is shown as cd  in case (L1) of figure 4.  
Case (L2): (O/2) < s d sl 
By the contrast, there are fewer residents in country L can afford the high quality goods because of poverty 
under case (L2). The consumer surplus from high quality good increases slightly. The welfare gains from 
consumer surplus of high quality good is dominated by the welfare loss from profit and consumer surplus of 
low quality good. Thus, the welfare falls as trade costs fall, i.e. (dSWL/dW) > 0, which is shown as cd c  in case 
(L2) of figure 4. Our results for the case of unilateral trade are summarized as follows. 
 
Proposition 2. (Unilateral trade, (O/2) < s d 1) A fall in trade costs may lower the welfare in the poor country 
but definitely raises that in the rich one when unilateral trade occurs. 
 
These interesting results point out that economic integration always benefits the rich country but may 
hurt the poor one when the trade cost drops in the area of unilateral trade.  
 
3.3 Bilateral trade: 0 d W d Wl 
When trade costs fall further, say 0 d W d Wl, intra-industry trade occurs. Under this case, the two firms 
compete in a Bertrand duopoly in both countries. The prices and the sales for the two firms are denoted by (6) 
and (7), respectively. For firm h, there is more competition in its home market that causes profits to drop, i.e., 
(dShH/dW) > 0. On the other hand, a reduction in trade costs increases the profits from its exports to country L, 
i.e., (dShL/dW ) < 0. Furthermore, more varieties and lower prices caused by intensive competition in country H 
will increase consumer surplus, i.e., (dCSH/dW) < 0. The welfare of rich country H consists of consumer 





4 2(2 ) 4(2 )[ ]  ( ) 0  
(4 ) (4 )
4 (2 )             ( ) .









W O O O
W O MT O O
O O MTW W O O O
     ! d 
! d {   
                      (9) 
Comparing HW and Wl, we find that Wl > (d) HW when s < (t) sh{ [2O(2O)2 /(4O215O+12)]. The welfare effect 
in country H can be divided into two cases, which are shown as case (H1) and case (H2) of figure 3.  
Case (H1): sh < s d 1 
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Under case (H1), in addition to rising consumer surplus in country H, the profits of firm h could be increasing 
due to more export profits when the export market is rich enough as trade costs are falling. So, there is 
welfare-increasing for rich country, (d SWH/dW) < 0 if sh < s d 1, which is shown as CD  in case (H1) of figure 
3. 
Case (H2): (O/2) < s d sh 
There is a U-shaped relationship between the welfare of country H and trade costs if the income disparity is 
bigger than that in case (H1), which is shown as 'CD  in case (H2) of figure 3. 
We now turn to analyze the welfare effects of falling trade costs for the poor country under bilateral trade 
case.  For firm l, the profits from its export market are increasing when trade costs are falling, (d SlH/dW) < 0. 
Moreover, it is more competitive in its home market that causes its profits to shrink, i.e. (d SlL/dW) > 0. Finally, 
the profits of firm l go downward and then upward as trade costs fall.  
After considering consumer surplus, we obtain the welfare effect in the poor country L as follows: 
2
2





O O OO W W WW O O
   :    ! d ! d :         (10) 
where LW = :(83O)/ {(1-O)[(2(2O)2/O)+(4-O)/s]}. Comparing LW  with Wl , we find that Wl < LW  if [O/(2O)]{ sl 
< s d 1 ; while Wl t LW  if  (O/2) < s d sl. This is the same condition referring to case (L1) and case (L2) in 
section 3.1. It implies that the welfare decreases with trade costs under case (L1). However, there is a U-
shaped relationship between welfare and trade costs in country L under case (L2). Although the sales of high 
quality good in country L are increased when trade costs are falling, that is limited when country L is poor. 
Therefore, the welfare in country L is a U-shaped when (O/2) < s d sl , which is shown as d ec c  in case (L2) of 
figure 4. However, there is more consumption of high quality goods when country L is richer and that causes 
the consumer surplus to rise greatly when sl < s d 1. So, economic integration benefits the welfare in country 
L from bilateral trade, i.e., (dSWL/dW) < 0, which is shown as de  in case (L1) of figures 4.  
Comparing sl with sh, we have sh > sl. It is worth to note that the poor country welfare is increasing while 
the rich country one may be decreasing with lower trade cost when the income disparity lies sl < s d sh. It 
implies that economic integration doesn’t always benefit all countries, even could lower the welfare of rich 
country. 
Figure 3 and figure 4 illustrate that given the welfare in each country is a function of trade cost, the 
shapes are contingent on the degree of income disparity between the two countries. To clarify these results, 
we separate the degrees of income disparity into five levels as shown in figure 5. Disparity level I, II and III 
are discussed in this section and level IV and V will be discussed in section 4. These lead to the following 
proposition 
Insert figure 5 about here. 
 
Proposition 3. (Bilateral trade, (O/2) < s d 1)  
(1) A fall in trade costs raises both countries’ welfare, when the income levels are identical or very close 
(level I, sh < s d 1).  
(2) A fall in trade costs raises the welfare of the poor country, but may lower the welfare of rich one, when 
the income disparity lies in level II (level II, sl < s d sh). 
(3) Both countries have a U shape relationship between the welfare and trade costs when the income 
disparity lies in level III (level III, (O/2) < s d  sl). 
 
Clarke and Collie (2003) consider horizontal intra-industry trade and show that welfare as a function of 
trade costs is a U-shaped under the bilateral trade for the case of symmetric countries. However, their results 
do not hold when vertical intra-industry trade occurs. We find that a fall in trade costs is welfare-increasing 
for both countries even though there is no income difference. It implies that the two countries are in 
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agreement on the proceeds of economic integration.  Conflicting welfare effects arise if the disparity is in 
level II. Under this case, it is difficult for the two countries to be in agreement on the proceeds of economic 
integration. 
 
4. Welfare analysis: a large income disparity (0 < s d (O/2); that is Wl > Wh) 
4.1 No trade: W >Wl 
We are now turn to the case when the income disparity is large, say 0 < s d (O/2). The analysis is similar to 
that in the previous section. There is no trade occurs when W > Wl and the welfare of country L is the same as 
that under autarky. However, welfare-increasing has already happened in country H before trade actually 
occurs. Welfare increases because firm h sets a lower price in his home market to avoid the potential threat of 
low quality firm when trade costs fall to Wl < W d W’0 . This is shown as GH  in figure 7.  
 
Insert figure 6 and 7 about here.  
4.2 Unilateral trade: Wh< W d Wl 
When the trade costs decrease to the range of (Wh,Wl), firm l will unilaterally export to country H. In this 
case, firm l is still a monopolist in country L and earns additional profits from its exports to country H. The 
welfare in country L increases as the trade costs fall, (d SWL/ dW) < 0, which is shown as gh  in figure 6.  
The profits of firm h in country H will decrease due to intensive competition as trade costs decrease, i.e., 
(dShH/dW) > 0. Moreover, the consumer surplus in country H is increasing from lower prices and more variety 
goods as trade costs fall, i.e., (dCS H/dW) < 0. Summing up consumer surplus and profits of firm h in its 
domestic market, a fall in trade costs is welfare-reducing for the rich country under unilateral trade case, i.e., 
(d SWH/dW)) > 0, which is shown as HI  in figure 7.  
The results show that economic integration raises the welfare of poor country, but lower the welfare of 
rich country under unilateral trade. This leads to the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 4. (Unilateral trade, 0 < s d (O/2)) Consider a large level of income disparity between the two 
countries, say 0 < s d (O/2), we find that a fall in trade costs raises the welfare of poor country, but lowers the 
welfare of rich one when unilateral trade occurs. 
 
4.3 Bilateral Trade: 0 d W d Wh  
By using similar analysis, the welfare effect in country L can be divided into two cases as follows.  
Case (L3): sL < s d (O/2) 
Under this case, although the export profits of firm l are increasing as trade cost falling, the loss of firm l from 
its domestic market becomes larger because the income level of residents in country L are acceptable to buy 
the high quality goods (level IV in figure 5). That causes the profits of firm l be a U-shaped with trade costs. 
Summing up consumer surplus in country L and the profits of firm l, we find that the poor country’s welfare 
as a function of the trade costs is U-shaped and reaches a minimum at W = LW if the degree of income disparity 
is level IV ( sL < s d (O/2)), which is shown as hi  in case (L3) of figure 6.  
Case (L4): 0 < s d sL 
By contrast to case (L3), the loss of firm l from its domestic market becomes less because the income level of 
residents in country L are too poor (0 < s d sL). Finally, the consumer gains dominate the loss of profits of 
firm l. Therefore, we find that there is welfare-increasing if income disparity is large enough, say 0 < s d sL, as 
shown in case (L4) of figure 6.  
We turn to analyze the welfare effects of falling trade costs for the rich country when bilateral trade 
occurs. A fall in trade costs will raise the profits that firm h earns from its exports to the foreign market, and 
so we obtain (dShL/dW) < 0. However, the profits from its exports increase slightly because fewer residents in 
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country L can afford the high quality goods. Meanwhile, a fall in trade costs also lead to a lower profits in its 
home market due to a stronger competition, (dShH/dW) < 0. We find a U-shaped relationship between the 
profits of firm h and trade costs. On the other hand, because of the lower prices caused by the competition, the 
consumer surplus in country H is increasing when trade costs are falling. Finally, equation (9) shows that the 
welfare in country H first declines in the stage of bilateral trade, reaches its minimum at HW { [4O(2O)I LT ]/ 
[(4O)s + 2O(2O)2], and then climbs up when trade costs fall below HW , which is shown as IJ  in figure 7. 
The results are summarized as follows.  
 
Proposition 5. (Bilateral trade, 0 < s d  (O/2))Consider a large income disparity between the two countries, 
say 0 < s d (O/2). When bilateral trade occurs, we find the following results. 
(1) The welfare effects of falling trade costs on the two countries are consistent when the degree of income 
disparity is in level IV in figure 5, say [O/2W(2O)2][I HT (83O)-W(4O)] { sL < s < (O/2). 
(2) A fall in trade costs raises the welfare of poor country, but may lower the welfare of rich one when the 
income disparity is in level V  in figure 5, say 0 < s d sL. 
 
Proposition 5 shows that at initial stage of economic integration from bilateral trade, there is opposing 
welfare effects on the two countries under level V degree of income disparity (0 < s d sL). In other words, 
economic integration is beneficial for the poor country, but may be detrimental the welfare of rich one. This 
implies that the rich country does not always benefit from the process of economic integration (a fall in trade 
costs) when the differentials in income level of integrated countries is extremely large. It also indicates that it 
is difficult for two countries to be in agreement on the proceeds of economic integration.   
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
  We have presented a model that shows how changes in the trade cost affect the pattern of trade as well as 
their respective welfare implications. In the model where vertically differentiated products are traded and the 
countries are different in their income distribution. 
The paper delivers several interesting results. First of all, trade patterns are affected by the differentials in 
income level of integrated countries. Secondly, economic integration may have distinct welfare effects on the 
two countries. Economic integration is detrimental for the rich country from unilateral trade when the income 
disparity is large. Besides, a fall in trade costs raises the welfare of poor country, but may lower the welfare of 
rich one from bilateral trade when the income disparity is extremely large. It implies that at some levels of 
income disparity and some stages of economic integration, there may indeed be conflicting interests between 
rich and poor countries with respect to continuing the process of market integration. 
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Fig. 1. Trade patterns in a small income disparity, (O/2) < s d 1 
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Fig. 3. The relationship between SWH and trade costs when (O/2) < s d 1 
Bilateral trade 
 
Unilateral trade: H Æ  L  
No trade 
W 
Bilateral trade Unilateral trade: L Æ H  No trade 
W 
808   Zhi-Win Wu and Yan-Shu Lin /  Procedia Economics and Finance  5 ( 2013 )  799 – 808 







Case (L1).  sl < s  d1
    








Case (L2).  (O/2) < s dsl 
 
Fig. 4. The relationship between SWL and trade costs when (O/2) < s d 1 
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